Europe should stop taxing innovation. Bruegel Policy Brief 2010/02, March 2010 by van Pottelsberghe, Bruno.
EUROPE SHOULD STOP
TAXING INNOVATION
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE2010/02
MARCH 2010
by Bruno van Pottelsberghe
Senior Fellow at Bruegel
Professor at the Université Libre de
Bruxelles
bvp@bruegel.org
POLICY CHALLENGE
The risk for Europe is that current moves result in a patent agreement that
does not cure the system of its major ills, and thus does not bring about
any significant improvement for those who need it most: entrepreneurs and
innovative companies starting out on the innovation process. The creation
of an effective single
European patent requires i)
English-only post-grant
translation, ii) the end of
nationally granted patents,
iii) phasing-out of the current
‘European patent’, iv) lower
fees for young innovative
companies, and v) a radical
shake-up of the governance
of the European Patent Office. 
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SUMMARYThe European Union failed to achieve its Lisbon agenda target of
spending three percent of GDP on research and development, and so, in the
EU2020 strategy, has given itself another decade to meet this goal.
Meanwhile, the EU has been leapfrogged by China in terms of business R&D
spend. One key element to stimulate innovation and ultimately drive
European growth would be to create the long-awaited single EU patent.
Today’s fragmented European patent system is poor value for money and
overly complex, not least because national patent systems still have the
last word over all European patents on their territory. After nearly 50 years
of failure to create the EU patent, language issues and the design of a cen-
tralised patent litigation court remain unresolved. The recent EU Council
deal on an ‘enhanced’ European patent system is potentially a step forward,
though many problems remain unresolved.
Source: Bruegel based on van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) and van
Pottelsberghe and François (2009). Figures refer to 2008.1
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Source: OECD, MSTI, 2007-8. Figure 1a: gross expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP. Figure 1b: industry-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP.
1. For a detailed
analysis, see van
Pottelsberghe (2009).      
PATENT SYSTEMS underpin eco-
nomic growth. If a patent system
is suboptimal, it is a sure sign that
research and development will be
hampered and growth will be ham-
strung. A well-functioning patent
system is a fundamental frame-
work condition to sustain the pace
of innovation and the distribution
of its benefits both within and
between countries
1.
Europe has been working on its
patent system for more than 45
years and it is still a work in
progress. Unnecessary expense
and legal uncertainty still abound.
Yet these are the very two features
that count the most for business,
especially small and medium-
sized companies. There is still no
simple ‘one-stop-shop’ for compa-
nies seeking Europe-wide patent
protection, and duplicate fees and
administrative charges – not to
mention the burden of possibly
multiple litigation – bloat the cost
of patenting in Europe. The EU
faces increasing competition from
China, Japan and the United States
for scientific talent and R&D
resources, and so if Europe is seri-
ous about creating the right envi-
ronment for innovation and
growth, it needs to sort out its
patent system fast. Until it does
so, Europe is effectively putting a
tax on innovation.
Ten years ago the EU aspired to
invest three percent of its GDP in
R&D by 2010. It still spends less
than two percent. Not only has
Europe’s R&D effort been flat-lin-
ing  for 20 years (see Figure 1a),
but Europe still lags far behind the
US and Japan on this score and is
being leapfrogged by China, as
illustrated by business R&D spend
(see Figure 1b). The trend sug-
gests that the relative situation
will worsen for Europe. China has
long had two decisive competitive
advantages over Europe: its large
‘single’ market and a low-cost but
educated workforce. It is fast
acquiring a third one: its ability to
innovate (see Figure 2 on the next
page).
In its ‘Europe 2020’ strategy for
smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth – the successor to the EU’s
Lisbon agenda – the EU has rolled
over the R&D spending target of
three percent of GDP. Among the
factors that should spur greater
business R&D spending is the
patent system, but the
Commission president recognises
that Europe’s patent system is fail-
ing to pull its weight, in particular
because it is fragmented:
‘There are some things in our
strategy that you will have
heard before. We make no apol-
ogy for that. They would not be
here if they had been done
properly in the last ten years. To
give some examples: it is not
acceptable that because we do
not have a Community patent,
European companies face
translation costs of around
€3000 on each patent. It is thir-
teen times more expensive in
the EU than in the US and eleven
times more expensive than in
Japan’(Barroso, 2010).
True, the patent system is not the
only cause of Europe’s lack of
inventive activity, but it is one of
the weakest links between
Europe’s still-strong scientific
base and its lack of knowledge-
based entrepreneurship. 
In December 2009, EU industry
ministers meeting in the
Competitiveness Council claimed
Figure 1: Asian progress, European stagnation
1a: R&D intensity of major economies, 1980-2007 1b: Business-funded R&D as a % of GDPEUROPE SHOULD STOP TAXING INNOVATION
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2. Meeting of 4
December 2009; see eg
EurActiv, 7 December
2009, ‘Sweden claims
breakthrough on EU
patent impasse’.
3. In the remainder of
this document we will
use the new term ‘EU
patent’, not
‘Community’ patent.The
post-Lisbon Treaty ‘EU
patent’ project  was for
nearly 50 years called
the ‘Community patent’.
But the key material
distinction to make is
between the yet-to-be-
achieved Commmunity/
EU patent and  the cur-
rent ‘European patent’,
which is in effect a
patent that must be
managed and enforced
in each country target-
ed for protection.
4. Evidence for higher
quality in Europe comes
from a lower grant rate,
a lower workload per
examiner and other
structural factors as
detailed in van
Pottelsberghe (2009).
to have, at last, overcome the
intractable problems that have
prevented the EU patent from
becoming a reality
2. Optimistic
declarations were made about a
deal that would ‘make patenting
and innovating easier and more
affordable.’ Unfortunately, the evi-
dence seems to tilt towards a
rather less optimistic assessment
(see section 3).
This Policy Brief argues that
Europe needs more substantial
improvements to be made to its
patent system, including a radical
overhaul of its governance.
Section 1 explains why and how a
patent system should sustain an
economy’s long-term competitive-
ness, and briefly summarises the
weaknesses of the current sys-
tem. Section 2 discusses the vari-
ous reasons that might plausibly
lie behind  the nearly 50-year long
resistance to an EU patent
3.
Section 3 analyses the strengths
and weaknesses of the measures
agreed upon by industry ministers
in December 2009. Section 4 con-
cludes and puts forward policy
recommendations.
1 A NECESSARY REFORM
In order to work properly, a patent
system must, first, guarantee a
sufficient level of quality in the
screening of applications by a
patent office and, second, be
affordable for small, financially
constrained entities like high-tech
start-ups. The European Patent
Office (EPO), which carries out
prior-art searches and tests for
inventiveness before granting so-
called ‘European’ patents, per-
forms well on most quality indica-
tors, especially when compared to
its US counterpart
4.
But the European system is expen-
sive. Once granted, a European
patent can only be enforced at
national level: it must be translat-
ed into several languages and
national validation fees and annu-
al renewal fees must be paid. To
this, for each fee payment, one
must add the frequently compul-
sory national intermediation serv-
ices, whereby locally accredited
patent attorneys interact with
national patent offices (NPO) on
behalf of the patent owner. Any
subsequent enforcement issue is
dealt with at the national level,
with national jurisdictions having
the ultimate power to decide on
the outcome of patent-related
litigation. 
This fragmented system, if one can
call it a ‘system’, leads to seven
failings, described in Box 1 on the
next page. As a consequence of
these failings, the European patent
system is effectively a tax on
innovation, and prevents the
emergence of an integrated mar-
ket for inventions and technolo-
gies at the very outset of the
innovation process. This flawed
system is especially detrimental
to young innovative firms.
2 WHY NO EU PATENT AFTER
NEARLY 50 YEARS OF DEBATE?
Two official ‘fig-leaves’...
The ‘official’ reasons for the failure
to create an EU patent are related
to language and the centralised
litigation system. On the language
question, the blockage comes
from countries that refuse to allow
patents published in a foreign lan-
guage to be enforced within their
borders, arguing that this would
put local entrepreneurs at a major
disadvantage compared to foreign
competitors. So far, and whatever
the true merits of this argument,
no agreement has been reached
on the translation requirements
that would apply with the EU
patent. Language remains a major
stumbling block.
On the question of the potential
establishment of a centralised
patent-litigation system, EU mem-
ber states have so far been unable
to agree on where and how a
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Figure 2: Evolution of patent applications at major patent offices
Source: Bruegel based on annual reports of national patent offices.European court would be set up,
essentially arguing that national
legal systems differ significantly.
...and an additional cause of
blockage?
There are two additional explana-
tions for political inertia: financial
flows and loss of control. The cre-
ation of the EU patent would have
significant consequences for sev-
eral institutions. For instance, the
renewal fees paid for the mainte-
nance of European patents and
received by NPOs (€ 654 million in
2008) are split into two parts: half
is retained by the NPOs and half is
remitted to the EPO. Needless to
say, this practice generates sub-
stantial revenues for NPOs (€327
million, of which about €100
BOX 1:
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF EUROPE’S FRAGMENTED PATENT SYSTEM (van Pottelsberghe, 2009)
• Affordability: A European patent that is maintained for ten years in just six countries is four times more
expensive than in the US, Japan and many other advanced economies. If all EU countries are targeted for
protection, costs are around 20 times higher than in the US.
• Low quality: most NPOs continue to grant national patents independently of the EPO, meaning that appli-
cants have a choice of routes for protection. This has resulted in heterogeneous quality standards.
• Complexity:enforcing and monitoring patents in many countries is cumbersome, especially for academic
spin-offs and high-tech start-ups.
• Uncertainty: patents of inventions with high market value are frequently subject to litigation. Within
Europe, this can lead to parallel litigations in several countries, often with divergent outcomes (ie one
country upholds a patent, a second country invalidates the very same patent).
• Lack of coherence: First, it is simple to operate ‘parallel imports’. Since patents are rarely protected in all
EU countries, it is possible to put imitation products onto the European market by first entering through a
state in which the competing patented product is not protected and then distributing the imitation prod-
ucts across Europe. Second, there are ‘time paradoxes’, whereby patent infringement damages may be
awarded by a national court for a patent that is later declared invalid by the EPO.
• No coordination at EU level: there is very little if any EU-level coordination of patent policies and other
directly related policies, including science and technology, competition, research and entrepreneurship.
• Weakness in global negotiations:the European patent system does not so far have one single representa-
tive in international negotiations. Rather, national patent offices have signed unilateral agreements that
on past evidence have influenced EPO behaviour (see, for instance, the signatory members of the Patent
Prosecution Highways, or PPHs)
5.
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5. As explained in van
Pottelsberghe (2009),
PPHs are collaborative
agreements that con-
sist of work-sharing
practices. without coor-
dination of quality
criteria. 
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Table 1: Net financial flows resulting from a shift from the current
system to an EU patent, by sector (€m)
EPO NPOs
Business
sector
Attorneys &
translators Lawyers
Designation fees EPO -25 +40 -15
Validation fees NPOs -10 +10
Translation costs -20 +129 -129
Filing patent translation +60 -60
Taking over representation +46 -46
Intermediary cost for
maintenance
+20 -20
Drop in parallel litigation* +121 -121
Renewal fees** +88 +88 -176
Total +43 +78 +250 -270 -121
Source: Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2009), including data from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer
(2008). The simulations are performed for 50,000 patents granted by the EPO (representing the
actual annual average over the past few years), assuming EPO would machine-translate all granted
patents into all EU official languages. * Harhoff (2009) for the lower bound simulation of litigation
costs; ** Based on renewal fees generated by the EU patent being split equally between the EPO and
the NPOs. The dynamic effect of a more attractive patent system would result in higher maintenance
rates and thus more income from renewal fees for both the EPO and NPOs.million and €40 million for the
German and UK patent offices,
respectively). Danguy and van
Pottelsberghe (2009) have simu-
lated the financial consequences
of a straight switch of 50,000
patents granted by the EPO under
the current system to the EU
patent. Table 1 outlines the net
financial flows, which include
changes to renewal fees,
translation costs, intermediation
costs and litigation costs.
In a nutshell, the EU patent would
result in net savings of €250
million for the business sector. But
contrary to common assumption,
both the EPO and NPOs would also
benefit, in the former case by €43
million, and in the latter by  €78
million. On the other hand attor-
neys and translators would lose
€270 million and the drop in paral-
lel-litigation costs would amount
to at least €121 million. In other
words, nearly €400 million would
be redirected from patent attor-
neys, translators
and lawyers to
patent offices and
the business sector.
It is worth noting
that all NPOs would
see a net increase in
their budget, except
for the German
patent office, which
would lose the current benefit of
its ‘largest-economy’ status for
European patenting activity.
Whatever the real reasons for
resistance to change, the fact
remains that the current system is
overly complex, untransparent and
unpredictable, and ultimately con-
stitutes a heavy tax on individual
inventors and young innovative
companies (Veugelers, 2009).
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3 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT
The December 2009 Competitive-
ness Council reached ‘conclusions
on an enhanced patent system in
Europe’. The main conclusions
were that a European patent court
would be created, that the
European Patent Network (the cur-
rent arrangements
between the EPO
and NPOs) should
be strengthened,
and that an EU
patent should be
created. The conclu-
sions are promising
but also have major
weaknesses.
The strengths...
An EU patent is envisaged, but so
far no agreement has been
reached on translation require-
ments associated with it. The main
strength of the deal is the
progress made on convergence on
some aspects of the centralised-
litigation process, called the
‘European and EU Patent Court’
(EEUPC), with exclusive jurisdic-
tion in respect of civil litigation
related to upholding and invalidat-
ing EU patents and European
patents. The EEUPC would include
a Court of First Instance, a Court of
Appeal and a Registry. 
This deal has two broad conse-
quences: the establishment of a
single centralised litigation sys-
tem covering both EU and
European patents, and a possible
reduction in the relative cost of the
EU patent (see Figure 3), as the
market would cover 500 million
inhabitants. Danguy and van
Pottelsberghe (2009) estimate
that the cost per million capita
could eventually drop by about 45
percent, depending on the final fee
schedule and translation
agreement.
...and weaknesses
The wording of the Competitive-
ness Council agreement indicates
a very preliminary and fragile
agreement. As well as a high
degree of caution, there are five
main weaknesses of the Council’s
EPO-13 * EPO-6 * EU patent US Japan S. Korea Brazil China  
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Figure 3: Relative patent costs
(cumulated cost per million capita, €s)
Source: Bruegel based on van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) and Danguy and van Pottelsberghe
(2009). Figures refer to 2008.
‘The system is com-
plex, untransparent
and unpredictable,
and is ultimately a
heavy tax on
innovative firms.’‘conclusions on an enhanced
patent system in Europe’.
No language agreement: a ‘sepa-
rate regulation’ on the language
regime still has to be agreed to.
Knowing that a key dimension of
the EU patent is its simplified lan-
guage regime, a big step still
remains to be taken.
Another layer of patents: the
envisaged EU patent would be an
additional layer, on top of the cur-
rent European and national
patents. NPOs will still grant
patents independently from the
EPO. Thus applicants can still opt
for multiple parallel applications to
national offices, some of which
may provide an easier route to
protection than the EPO process,
especially for patents with a low
inventive step. 
Institutional ‘financial’ sustain-
ability: The EEUPC has, according
to the Council deal, to be self-
financing, with its own financial
revenues consisting of court fees.
This could lead to overly expensive
litigation proceedings. In any case,
the Council’s demand for budget
neutrality of the EEUPC, though
part of an agreed political package
containing positive elements, is
hardly a sign that European gov-
ernments are ready to boost
support for innovation.
Governance failure: this is evi-
denced by a fragile agreement, an
unsolved language puzzle, the lack
of willingness to create a truly cen-
tralised patent system (three lay-
ers are still envisaged), and a
strong focus on an ‘enhanced part-
nership’ between the EPO and
NPOs (the European Patent
Network). It may be noted that
NPOs sit on the administrative
council of the EPO and also influ-
ence negotiations on the EU
patent given that they participate
in the Council’s preparatory work-
ing groups in this field. 
Still no provisions for SMEs:
whereas the US and Japan have
had provisions for SMEs for many
years (SMEs pay only half the
fees), the EPO has no fee schedule
for SMEs. This is also true for the
future EEUPC, which must be self-
funded and might lead to prohibi-
tive litigation costs for SMEs.
4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Even if the recent Council conclu-
sions represent some progress on
the road to an effective and effi-
cient European patent system,
there are still a series of problems
that must still be addressed. We
have picked out four issues which
are the keys to success:
• Language
• Complexity
• Affordability
• Governance
Problem 1: language. Language
has so far been a major obstacle to
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Table 2: Filing languages at the EPO, by selected country of residence of applicants, 2009
English German French Unknown Total % English*
Austria 362 1141 0 0 1503 24%
Belgium 1438 36 142 3 1619 89%
Denmark 1445 40 1 0 1486 97%
Finland 1429 11 0 6 1446 99%
France 2712 161 6009 4 8886 31%
Germany 4918 20,129 44 2 25,093 20%
Italy 3693 52 7 88 3840 98%
Luxembourg 196 34 22 1 253 78%
Netherlands 6663 47 5 24 6739 99%
Norway 465 20 6 0 491 95%
Poland 141 16 2 10 169 89%
Portugal 101 2 4 0 107 94%
Spain 1135 51 36 26 1248 93%
Sweden 3089 47 5 5 3146 98%
Switzerland 3464 2017 375 3 5859 59%
United Kingdom 4763 18 21 2 4804 99%
Total 102,843 24,452 6764 242 134,301 77%
Source: EPO; the numbers include Euro-direct applications and PCT-regional phase. * = patents filed in English divided by the total of patents filed in
English, French and German.the EU patent. Instead of compul-
sory translation into several lan-
guages, patents granted by the
EPO should be ‘English only’. There
are several reasons for this:
• English is the most frequently
used business language world-
wide, and this is a factor with
patents as much as in other
fields. Of the patent applica-
tions filed at the
EPO, 77 percent
are already in
English (see Table
2). Use of English
thus represents
the choice of the
business sector,
especially tech-
nology-based
start-ups and aca-
demic spin-offs. English is also
de facto the worldwide scientif-
ic and technical language.
Evidence is provided by the
rankings of scientific journals,
used to gauge academic scien-
tists’ production in most
European countries. The majori-
ty of ranked journals (more
than 95 percent) are English-
language
6.
• The question for the future is
not if French or German will
remain scientific and technical
languages but if English will be
challenged by Chinese. The
Chinese emergence is a matter
of fact (Figure 2). According to
Thomson Reuters, the number
of scientific articles published
by authors based in China have
quadrupled since 2000, with
more than 110,000 articles in
2008 alone. The EU should
secure its long-term access to
scientific knowledge by ensur-
ing English remains the main
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6. See for instance the
journals listed in the
CNRS ranking in France,
or in the German
Academic Association
for Business Research
(Verband der
Hochschullehrer für
Betriebswirtschaft).
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language of communication for
business, scientific and techno-
logical matters.
• At the same time, switching to
English would be a resolute
European step towards the
improvement of the global
patent system. An English
translation of the whole docu-
ment would make the codified
knowledge accessi-
ble to third parties
(including Japan,
the US, China and
India), and thus
would improve the
identification of
prior art by non-
European compa-
nies and patent
offices, thereby
reinforcing the protection of EU
firms abroad.
• When it comes to checking if
new technology has already
been patented, patents in
national languages are of little
use. This is because a technolo-
gy-based new venture located,
for example in Belgium, must in
any case look beyond the infor-
mation available in Dutch and
French when conducting a free-
dom-to-operate survey (ie test-
ing if the new venture infringes
any existing patents).
Therefore, requiring translation
of patents into national lan-
guages does not serve its stat-
ed objective of supporting
innovation.
Problem 2: complexity. The
agreement on an ‘enhancement’ of
the patent system involves adding
an additional layer to it. The pro-
posed system would be composed
of nationally granted patents,
European patents (for protection
in selected countries) and EU
patents (for protection in the
whole EU). There will thus still be
ample scope for individual busi-
nesses to ‘game’ the system. But
this arrangement is also a clear
message that Europe does not
give top priority to creating a sin-
gle, market-spanning patent sys-
tem (as the US and China have).
The cost of this approach is ulti-
mately borne by the European
economy as a whole. The solution
is twofold: 
• NPOs should stop granting
patents, but should still provide
advice and search services for
local companies. 
• Agreement should be reached
to end the current European
patent directly, or at least to
phase it out after a few years of
a dual system.
Problem 3: lack of affordability for
SMEs and especially young inno-
vative companies. The EU patent
would already be a huge step for-
ward for these applicants. Relative
costs (per million capita) would
drop substantially (Figure 3). But
more could be done to further off-
set these high entry fees:
• A 50 percent reduction in entry
fees for young innovative com-
panies (filing fees, search fees,
examination fees) up to the
sixth year (the average dura-
tion of the examination period).
• A pay-back process (of the 50
percent reduction) could be
scheduled for companies that
keep their patents enforced for
more than six years.
‘Agreement should be
reached to end the
current European
patent directly, or at
least to phase it out
after a few years of a
dual system.’b
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Problem 4: Governance failure.
Presently, 27 NPOs with frequent-
ly diverging views control the EU
system. They fear that reform will
undermine them. Furthermore, the
EPO is independent from EU insti-
tutions, meaning little coordina-
tion between it and the European
Commission. Two steps should be
taken to bridge these gaps:
• Other key stakeholders than
NPOs should be part of the
administrative council, includ-
ing a representative of the busi-
ness sector (large firms and
small firms), a representative
of consumers’ associations, a
representative of academic
institutions, and representa-
tives of the EU institutions, for
example from the directorates-
general for research, enterprise
or internal market.
• The board of the EPO should be
streamlined, with the number of
representatives of national
patent offices sitting on it being
reduced from 35 currently to 10
or 15.
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